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Im Zentrum dieses Beitrags stehen die Kontroversen um eine angemessene Versorgung von 
Veteranen und Kriegsopfern im Nachkriegskosovo. Der institutionalisierte Umgang mit Vetera-
nen in der ehemals serbischen Provinz Kosovo, die von 1999–2008 im Rahmen eines UN-Pro-
tektorats verwaltet wurde und am 17. Februar 2008 ihre Unabhängigkeit erklärte, war geprägt 
von den diametral entgegengesetzten Vorstellungen der internationalen Verwaltung und der 
albanischen Mehrheitsbevölkerung in Bezug auf den Charakter des entstehenden Staates und 
damit einhergehend, die gesellschaftliche Rolle der Veteranen. Gegenstand der Untersuchung 
sind die Ambivalenzen, die sich aus den beiden Staatskonzeptionen für die Veteranen ergeben: 
dem Aufbau eines national defi nierten, befreiten Kosovo – in dem ehemaligen Befreiungs-
kämpfern eine privilegierte Rolle zukommt – auf der einen Seite, und der Errichtung einer mul-
ti-ethnischen Gesellschaft im Rahmen einer internationalen Friedensmission, auf der anderen.
Th is article explores the veterans’ politics and policies towards the veterans of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), a guerrilla army which fought against regular and irregular 
Serbian / Yugoslav troops for Kosovo’s independence from Yugoslavia. Th e formerly Ser-
1 This research was funded by the Berghof Foundation for Confl ict Studies in the framework of a 28-month 
research project on “The role of non-state actors in the transformation of the confl icts in Macedonia and in 
Kosovo”, which was located at the University of Munich and supervised by Prof. Dr. Marie-Janine Calic. Results of 
this research have been published in: Isabel Ströhle, The Politics of Reintegration and War Commemoration. The 
Case of the Kosovo Liberation Army, in: Südosteuropa (in print). Parts of section 2 are very similar to sections in 
that article, which is, however, more extensive and focuses on the ex-KLA-members’ reintegration and demilita-
risation of post-war society. I warmly thank Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers for comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper.
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bian province of Kosovo was administered from 1999–2008 by the United Nations Mis-
sion in Kosovo (UNMIK). On 17 February 2008 it unilaterally declared independence 
with partial international backing on the condition that independence is supervised by 
a reconfi gured international mission.2 Social policy concerning the veterans of the KLA 
in post-war Kosovo was characterised by the fact that the international administration 
(UNMIK) and the local Kosovan institutions of self-government featured diametrically 
opposing views with regard to the nature of the state-in-creation and, by extension, to 
the role that should be attributed to the veterans in society.3 
Against this background, this paper will analyse the tensions that have grown out of 
the diff erent conceptualisations of the nascent state and its regime of social citizenship. 
Th e local actors of KLA veterans’ circles sought to establish an Albanian nation-state, in 
which the veterans were to be rewarded with a prominent role as liberators. In contrast, 
the international administration endeavoured to forge a multi-ethnic society within the 
framework of the international peacekeeping mission. In this, a collective identity as cul-
tivated by the veterans’ representatives was to be weakened, and a civic regime of social 
citizenship to be created. Described as a situation of ‘contingent sovereignty’ (cf. Elden 
2006), international actors and agencies asserted substantial infl uence over the drafting 
of social policy in post-war Kosovo and constructed benefi ts for war victims as a form 
of humanitarian relief for those most aff ected by the war. Th is model, however, was at 
odds with the expectations of local actors. Based on the historical experience of Socialist 
partisan veneration they expected a legally protected status and institutional support re-
warding the so-called ‘war categories’ in the long run.4 Th ey engaged in collective forms 
of war commemoration, which were infused with nationalist contents, yet were to create 
a new social hierachy which rewarded the respective contributions to achieving ‘national 
liberation’ and an independent state.
Th e empirical material for this study resulted from six months of fi eldwork between 
September 2008 and April 2010. A fi rst set of qualitative data derives from a dozen 
informal interviews and fi fteen narrative biographical interviews.5 A second set includes 
the results of 25 semi-structured interviews with international and local actors and ex-
2 The UN Special Envoy Marti Ahtisaari, put forward the Comprehensive Status Proposal after the status negot-
iation between Serbian and Albanian negotiation teams in Vienna had failed. It became a constitutive part of 
the Constitution of the independent Kosovan state and its implementation is supervised by the International 
Civilian Offi  ce in Kosovo.
3 Since this article puts strong emphasis on the local actors’ perspectives, I will use the term ‚war’ instead of ‚con-
fl ict’ throughout the text. Albanians commonly use the term ‘war of liberation’ (“lufta e lirisë”) or ‘armed struggle’ 
(“lufta e armatosur”) when referring to the KLA’s activities and the fi ghting between February 1998 and June 
1999.
4 The ‘categories that have emerged from war’ (“kategoritë të dalura nga lufta”) are similarly conceptualised to the 
‘three categories’ (“tri kategorije”) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the war population (“boračka populacija”) in the 
SFRY, referring to the the ‘veterans of the Kosovo Liberation Army’ (“veteranë të luftës së UÇK-së”), the ‘invalids 
of the KLA’ (“invalidë të luftës”) and the surviving dependants referred to as ‘martyrs’ families’ (“familje e dësh-
morëve”). 
5 These were conducted with KLA veterans both on their own and in groups. The interviewees were former 
members of the KLA from diff erent military ranks, regions and age groups. All my respondents requested the 
anonymisation of their names and can therefore not be individually identifi ed.
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perts in the fi eld of veteran politics.6 In the respective institutions, I gathered as many 
legal documents and as much statistical material as possible. Th roughout 2008 and up 
to April 2010 I collected newspaper articles on veterans’ issues and war commemoration 
in dailies with diff erent political leanings (‘Koha Ditore’, ‘Gazeta Express’ and ‘Epoka e 
Re’). In addition to these, I included articles on the veterans’ legislation prior to 2008 
as well as TV debates and documentaries on related issues, heroic biographies of fallen 
fi ghters and other local literature on the KLA and the war. 
The KLA: background and numbers 
Th e Kosovo Liberation Army (in Albanian, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, or UÇK), 
henceforth: KLA, was a guerrilla army fi ghting against regular (and irregular) Yugoslav /
Serbian troops for an independent Kosovo.7 In response to the abolishment of Kosovo’s 
autonomy and the reinstatement of Serbian centralist rule in 1989, the province with an 
Albanian majority developed a broad and non-violent resistance movement and set up 
a parallel system of institutions. It was led by the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja 
Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK), of which most members belonged to the former Socialist 
and urban elites. Only when the international community neglected to address the situ-
ation of Kosovo’s Albanians in the 1995 Dayton peace treaty for Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, passive forms of resistance increasingly lost their spell among the Albanians. While 
their President, Ibrahim Rugova, refused to consider more active forms of resistance, the 
Prime-Minister-in Exile, Bujar Bukoshi, pushed for a more pro-active orientation.
Until 1997 only marginal, radical groups like the KLA actively advocated armed resist-
ance. Some proponents of this orientation would later scorn Rugova’s non-violent resist-
ance as “morbid pacifi sm”.8 Th e KLA fi rst came to public attention in 1996 when issuing 
communiqués and carrying out attacks on Serbian police stations and offi  cials as well as 
on so-called Albanian collaborators. Violence in the Kosovan countryside increasingly 
escalated when Serbian troops encroached upon the civilian population in responding to 
KLA guerrilla attacks against Serbian police offi  cers and stations. At the time, however, 
6 Among the interviewed were members the staff  of the Prime Minister’s Offi  ce, the Veterans’ Offi  ce in the Prime 
Minister’s Offi  ce, the Department for Invalids and Martyrs’ Families Aff airs (DFDIL) in the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Welfare (MPMS), the leadership of the three ‘War Associations’ on the federal and municipal levels, the 
Council for the Defence of Veterans’ Rights, journalists, members of parliament, but also veterans in diffi  cult 
material conditions. 
7 The KLA’s ideological long term objective was the “liberation and unifi cation of all Albanian inhabited territories, 
as is refl ected in the offi  cial oath that was sworn to the Albanian fl ag with the double headed eagle by most, 
but not all of the fi ghters: “I, soldier of the Kosovo Liberation Army, swear that I will fi ght for the liberation and 
unifi cation of Albanian inhabited territories. I will always be a faithful soldier, a fi ghter of dignity and freedom, 
attentive, brave and disciplined and ready at all times to fi ght for the holy interest of the fatherland (‘atdhe’) 
without sparing my own life. If I will break this oath, I may be punished with the harshest laws of war and if I 
should betray it, I may pay with my own blood. I swear, I swear, I swear.”
8 James Pettifer, Koncept pёr Realitetin e Ri. Dialog me Hashim Thaçin [A Concept for a New Reality. Dialogue 
with…]. Prishtina 2001, p. 35.
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the KLA guerrilla troops were only a marginal force, consisting of a mere 150 members 
up until 1997, after which they catalysed into an armed resistance movement of several 
thousand.9 Following this unexpected surge in the number of fi ghters, the troops needed 
to be professionalised and organised. Th eir loose command structure and decentralised 
operative zones were to be transformed into a formally integrated chain of command 
during the course of the year 1998. But the KLA, in fact, never became a professional 
army.
It is relevant to point out that Bukoshi deployed another armed force in Kosovo, the 
Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (Alb. Forcat e Armatosura e Republikës së Ko-
sovës, FARK). FARK went back to an earlier attempt of the LDK to build up and train 
a professional defence force made up of former Yugoslav Army offi  cers and policemen as 
a secret part of their parallel system of governance. When the leaders of the two armed 
forces, KLA and FARK, however, failed to reach an agreement on cooperation in mid-
1998, Bukoshi refused to hand the funds over to the KLA, which had been collected 
among the Kosovan migrants in Europe;10 instead he recruited volunteers for his force 
independently from the KLA.11 FARK subsequently saw itself confronted with accusa-
tions of treason and faced even violent transgressions.12 While some FARK commanders 
agreed to integrate themselves into local KLA structures, in other zones, most famously 
in the West Kosovan Operative Zone of Dukagjin, confl ict and fi ghting broke out be-
tween the two rival troops. Th is confl ict was later also to be mirrored in the symbolic 
politics of war commemoration. 
Th e numbers of KLA fi ghters are very controversial and vary strongly, depending, among 
other things, on how KLA-membership is defi ned:13 Some sources include those who 
had been offi  cially recruited and who were clearly integrated into the command struc-
ture; others also include those who acted as armed members of a village guard. After the 
end of the war the International Organisation of Migration (IMO) registered 25,723 
fi ghters, while in 2008 the Veterans’ Organisation (OVL) claimed to include 23,000 
members.14 In contradiction to both these fi gures, a member of the General Staff  of the 
KLA claimed, in one of my interviews, that there were only 17,000 mobilised soldiers 
in March 1999; however, in subsequent conversation he corrected the number down to 
  9 Tim Judah, Kosovo. War and Revenge, New Haven / London 2000, p. 118. 
10 Ger Duijzings / Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, War within a War. Historical and Cultural Anthropological Back-
ground Report [Expert witness report commissioned by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia, ICTY, in the Hague, submitted 31 May 2004], No. P201IT-03-66-T. The Hague: International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2004, p. 79.
11 Interview VI; Ibid. 
12 One example is the murder of the FARK-commander Ahmet Krasniqi in Tirana, cf. Duijzings / Schwandner-Sie-
vers (2004), p. 113 f.
13 The formation of a governmental commission has been announced that will revisit the registers of the former 
KLA-fi ghters. 
14 Dmitry Pozhidaev / Ravza Andzhelich, Beating Swords into Plowshares. Reintegration of Former Combatants 
in Kosovo. Pristina: Center for Political and Social Research 2005. Available at: [http://unddr.org/docs/Beating%
20Swords%20Into%20Plowshares.pdf; accessed on 10.09.2010], p. 4; IOM. Socio-Economic and Demographic 
Profi les of Former KLA Combatants Registered by IOM. IOM: Pristina 2000. 
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9-10,000.15 Th is lower number is supported by the initial estimates of 8-10,000 fi ghters 
by KFOR and IOM.16 Th e diff erences in numbers can be explained on several grounds: 
naturally, the KLA camp profi ted from the claim that it was a strong fi ghting force, 
which provided it in turn with additional leverage in political negotiations. It commu-
nicated to the outside that the liberation movement had a broad popular support and 
therefore legitimised its political demands, but it also conferred legitimacy to the KLA 
camp in the internal Albanian power struggle between old, urban Socialist elites who had 
supported the LDK and the new elites who emerged from the war and were rooted in the 
rural regions. Another factor to be considered is the historical Socialist Yugoslav legacy 
of including not only those, who participated actively in the war with a weapon in their 
hand, in the war population, but also those who supported it “by other means”.17 It was 
repeatedly mentioned in the interviews that people who supplied the troops were added 
to the KLA registry on the grounds that they had risked their safety. 
In the aftermath of the war, the elites who had gained legitimacy and localised author-
ity through their active participation in the armed struggle, politically challenged the 
formerly urban Socialist elites. To account for the constituency of the KLA and its suc-
cessor organisations, it is necessary to point out that these are rooted in rural society 
and in the war-aff ected communities. An estimated 100,000 people were said to have 
been more or less directly involved in the armed resistance and according to the IOM 
registration about 225,000 people – about 10% of the overall population – were consid-
ered to be fi nancially dependent as family members on the ex-combatants.18 Hence, the 
post-war partisanship for former resistance fi ghters can also be interpreted as an attempt 
to advance the position of the rural and underdeveloped communities in the national 
competition for resources.
International state-building and external politics towards KLA veterans
In this section I outline some characteristics of the international state-building and post-
war reconstruction eff orts in relation to the emerging welfare regime in post-war Kos-
ovo and in relation to the political symbolism of the nascent state. In his famous 1983 
essay, Michael Geyer points to the intimate link between an institutional support for 
war victims and the rise of the welfare states in Europe by identifying the increasing 
institutionalisation of war relief as the “precursor of the welfare state”.19 Th e wars in 
15 Interview VVX.
16 Alpaslan Özerdem, From a ‚Terrorist‘ Group to a ‚Civil Defence‘ Corps. The ‚Transformation‘ of Kosovo Liberation 
Army, in: International Peacekeeping 10 (2003) 3: 79-101, here p. 85. 
17 Cf. Heike Karge’s contribution within this issue.
18 IOM (2000), p. 8. One cannot automatically assume that all family members supported the KLA. But since the 
village population esp. in KLA strongholds such as Gllogjan, Malisheva and Skenderaj was subject to heavy 
primary war experiences and the KLA was perceived as the only defence, one can assume a very high level of 
support.
19 Michael Geyer, Ein Vorbote des Wohlfahrtsstaates. Die Kriegsopferversorgung in Frankreich, Deutschland und 
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20th century Eastern Europe were generally represented and commemorated as wars of 
founding or re-founding nation-states. Hence, it is of particular relevance to examine the 
nature of the subsequently established welfare regimes in the light of the ways in which 
they refl ect the national identity. In the case of Kosovo, there is a stark contrast between 
the ways in which the local actors’ seek to imagine an Albanian nation-state in Kosovo by 
commemorating the war as the founding war of this nation-state and the international 
administration’s competing eff orts in forging a multi-ethnic society. As I will elaborate 
in more detail below, this contrast informs opposing notions and expectations regarding 
an appropriate war-related social assistance scheme and even explains local resistance to 
the international project.
In the aftermath of the war, UNMIK, mandated with administering Kosovo temporarily 
on the basis of UNSCR 1244, found itself confronted with the challenge of re-building 
a social welfare regime for the war-destroyed province. With the caesura of the war, the 
formal eligibility criteria to Serbian welfare benefi ts and social security provisions, of 
which the province of Kosovo had been a constitutive part, ultimately terminated.20 Th e 
case of Kosovo, thus, diff ers somewhat from the other case studies in Eastern Europe. 
At the turn of the twenty-fi rst century, social policy was no longer the sole concern of 
the sovereign state but was widely understood that in the context of globalisation, Eu-
ropeanisation and post-confl ict reconstruction, “international organisations compete to 
infl uence national social policy through loans, conditional aid, technical assistance, regu-
latory frameworks etc.”21 Various analyses suggest that the emerging welfare settlements 
in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are the products of multi-actored and multi-lay-
ered processes within the politics and economics of globalisation that shape social policy. 
Noting the considerable infl uence of international agencies over domestic politics in the 
context of post-war reconstruction eff orts, critics have highlighted that “peacebuilding 
missions are not merely exercises in confl ict management, but instances of a much larger 
phenomenon: the globalisation of a particular model of domestic governance – liberal 
market democracy – from the core to the periphery of the international system.”22 Yet 
compared to other case studies in Eastern Europe, Kosovo is further specifi c in that it 
constitutes a particularly extreme example of external intervention in policy formation: 
local actors played a rather insignifi cant role in the drafting of social policy. According 
to Cocozzelli’s in-depth analysis of the social welfare system in Kosovo, “the policy that 
emerged did not refl ect the preferences of the locals, nor did they express high levels of 
ownership over the policies or programs in most interviews.”23 
Großbritannien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Geschichte und Gesellschaft 9 (1983): 230-77.
20 In fact, already during the 1990s, parallel health and social welfare networks had been established in Kosovo as 
a constitutive part of the Albanians’ non-violent resistance movement, in: Fred Cocozelli (2009), p. 49 ff .
21 Bob Deacon / Paul Stubbs, Transnationalism and the Making of Social Policy in South-Eastern Europe, in: Ibid. 
(eds.), Social Policy and International Interventions in South East Europe, Edward Elgar: Northampton Mass. et al. 
2007: 1-22, p. 8. 
22 Roland Paris, International Peacebuilding and the ’Mission Civilisatrice’, in: Review of International Studies 28 
(2002) 4: 637-56, p. 638. 
23 Fred Cocozzelli, Final Executive Summary. Social Policy and Citizenship in Reconstruction: the Case of Kosovo. 
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To explicate the limitations in local ownership, it is necessary to point out the distribu-
tion of the legislative competencies in post-war Kosovo: Th e Kosovo Assembly, as part of 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), held the legislative competence 
from 2002-2008, but laws only became operative after the Special Representative of 
the Secretary General (SRSG), heading UNMIK, would promulgate them as being in 
accordance with UNSCR 1244. Th e offi  ce of the SRSG served as a supervisory body 
over the norms of liberal peace- and state-building and the SRSG “used his veto powers 
regularly to block draft legislation of the Kosovo Assembly and PISG and maintained 
wide-ranging legislative and executive control by issuing a number of administrative 
directions and regulations.”24 Since independence in 2007 and with the international 
presence re-confi gured, the International Civilian Representative has the power to block 
legislation, if this would contradict or violate provisions of the Ahtisaari-Plan with its 
extensive provisions of protecting minority rights.25 Th is led to a situation, in which the 
legal architecture for social assistance for the ‘war categories’ would be heavily infl uenced 
from outside.
Internationally run Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) pro-
grammes usually stop short of drafting a long-term social assistance framework sup-
porting war veterans, invalids and surviving dependants. Schafer problematises this ap-
proach: “While past Euro-American policies with regard to veterans often appealed to a 
language of rights and citizenship, nationalism and patriotism, the word ‘entitlement’ is 
conspiciously absent from recent policy manuals originating from the international in-
stitutions centrally involved in ‘reintegration’ programmes for former combatants.”26 In 
the case of Kosovo, the international administration’s approach towards veterans stood in 
stark contrast to the politics towards veterans hitherto experienced in Socialist Yugoslavia 
and the model of institutional support envisaged by local actors. Th e demobilisation and 
reintegration eff orts undertaken by the International Organisation for Migration mainly 
focused on the absorption of ex-combatants into the newly created civil institutions 
(such as the civil protection corps KPC and the police forces) and on providing assistance 
for their integration into the job market.27 In contrast to these reintegration eff orts, also 
in the case of Kosovo, scholars and policy-makers have neglected social welfare target-
ing war victims and veterans. Th is is particularly striking as both the war associations as 
well as my interviewees expected integration into society via legal regulation, as can be 
understood from the following opening words of a veteran in a group discussion: “Before 
2007. Available at: [http://www.irex.org/programs/symp/08/Coccozelli_Executive_Summary.pdf ].
24 Jens Narten, Dilemmas of Promoting “Local Ownership”. The Case of Postwar Kosovo, in: Roland Paris / Timothy 
Sisk (eds.), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations. Rout-
ledge: London / New York 2009: 252-283, p. 265.
25 Comprehensive Status Settlement. Available at: [http://www.ico-kos.org/d/Ahtisaari%20Comprehensive%20Pr
oposal%20in%20English.pdf; accessed on 10.09.2010]
26 Jessica Schafer, Soldiers at Peace. Veterans and Society after the Civil War in Mozambique. Palgrave Macmillan: 
N.Y. 2007,  p. 11.
27 The provisions for the process were set forth in the “Undertaking of demilitarisation and transformation of the 
KLA.” 20.06.1999. Available at:[ http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm; accessed on 10.09.2010]. 
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we start the interview, I have to tell you. We are not integrated at all; there is still no law 
this many years after [the war]”.28 
The struggle over war victims’ benefi ts
Th e following section outlines the diff erent articulations of war commemoration and the 
ways in which the inclusive and exclusive boundaries of the ‘war categories’ were formed 
over time. I will take both the opposing views of the international community and the 
local actors as well as the local “politics of war memory and commemoration” and pow-
er struggles into account here.29 Th e local actors and the international administration 
strongly contested the question of whether and how the ‘war categories’ should receive 
social assistance from local government structures. Ultimately, this question is intimately 
linked to contested visions of social citizenship. 
As Cocozzelli points out, “disagreements about social policy are often part of […] core 
political contestations because they are so important for the nature and quality of the 
governing regime and its interaction with the citizenry.”30 As such, they are deeply entan-
gled with the local confl ict history and post-war situation. In Kosovo, memory entrepre-
neurs have developed a script for an independent nation-state based on tropes of military 
resistance, heroic sacrifi ce and national unity.31 Th e memory entrepreneurs “imagine 
and concretely locate the nation in the local, traditionalist rural society”,32 that is, in the 
peripheries of the former Socialist centres of power. Subsequently they ventured to create 
and defend the boundaries of ethno-nationally defi ned political and social citizenship, 
but also to create a new social hierarchy based on anyone’s contribution to armed resist-
ance. Th ese entrepreneurs are mainly represented by the war associations and in some 
cases are members of the parties with a KLA background.33 Th e memory entrepreneurs 
consequently attacked the liberal citizenship regime, constructed by UNMIK to support 
28 Interview III.
29 T. G. Ashplant / Graham Dawson / Michael Roper (eds.), The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, Rout-
ledge: N.Y. 2004.
30 Cocozelli (2009), p. 30.
31 Anna Di Lellio / Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, The Legendary Commander. The Construction of an Albanian 
Master-Narrative in Post-War Kosovo. Nations & Nationalism, 12 (2006) 3: 513-529, p. 524. Jelin had originally 
coined the concept of “memory entrepreneurs” for the Argentinian context referring to “those who seek social 
recognition and political legitimacy of one (their own) interpretation or narrative of the past. We also fi nd [me-
mory entrepreneurs] engaged and concerned with maintaining and promoting active and visible social and 
political attention on their enterprise” (Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Struggle for Memories. London: 
Social Science Research Council 2003: 33-34). Schwandner-Sievers and Di Lellio applied the concept on Kosovo 
with a focus on the nationalisation and territorialisation of memory. In this study I examine how these memory 
entrepreneurs attempted to translate their war narrative into claims to social benefi ts. 
32 Ibid.
33 The main organs defending the ‘war values’ (‘vlerat e luftës’), lobbying for the recognition and advancement 
of the status of all war categories by law and for their legal and social protection are: The Organisation of the 
KLA War Veterans (OVL-UÇK), The Association of the KLA Invalids (SHIL) and the Association of the KLA Martyrs’ 
Families (SHFD).
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a ‘Kosovan’ identity prioritising individual rights and duties over communal identities 
and obligations,34 as well as subverted it in order to serve the veterans’ own agenda. Th e 
institutional support for the war categories by the local governmental structures has 
steadily increased from the year 2006 onwards. After the declaration of independence in 
February 2008, the memory entrepreneurs’ visions began to prevail on the political level 
with the introduction of an ‘Offi  ce for the Veterans of the War of the KLA’ in September 
2008 and the introduction of new initiatives for a legislation aimed at codifying the 
‘values of war’. 
In the immediate post-war context of emergency response, UNMIK was primarily con-
cerned with providing humanitarian relief for those most aff ected by the war. However, 
this social assistance was deliberately not diff erentiated according to the benefi ciaries’ 
contribution to the armed struggle and thereby strengthening internal identity claims in 
these terms.35 UNMIK Regulation 2000/66, issued in December 2000, and the subse-
quent administrative direction only regulated the allocation of fi nancial help to both ‘war 
invalids’ and ‘next of kin of those who died as a result of the armed confl ict’.36 It defi ned 
a ‘war invalid’ to be “any person who has received physical injury as a direct result of 
the armed confl ict in Kosovo,”37 be it as combatant or civilian. Children under the age 
of eighteen and spouses of those who died as a result of the armed confl ict qualifi ed to 
receive a pension as surviving dependants, or ‘next of kin’. Th e resulting social assist-
ance, administered by the Joint Interim Administrative Structure’s (JIAS) Department 
of Health and Social Welfare, did clearly not intend it to be an acknowledgement or 
recognition of contribution to the war. However, this regulation could not strengthen 
individual over communal identities as envisaged, because it defi ned the criteria for eli-
gibility very narrowly and did not meet the circumstances at hand: limiting pensions to 
those with a disability level over 40% would force those with a disability level below 40% 
to be dependent on their family’s support. Also, the fact of restricting benefi t payments 
to one applicant per family only, as well as confi ning eligibility for the surviving depend-
ants’ pension to children and spouses, would be likely to increase family and communal 
dependency and increase reliance on the veterans’ networks. 
Th e “Department for the Families of Martyrs, War Invalids and Families of Civilian 
Victims” (DFDIL), established as part of the PISG in December 2005 within the newly 
founded Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, took the fi rst step to subvert UNMIK’s 
claim to multi-ethnicity and the attempt to weaken the ex-combatants’ collective iden-
tity. According to its website, the DFDIL is responsible for providing care to all those, 
who “contributed to the freedom of Kosovo or were victimised over that question.” One 
of its declared responsibilities is “institutional support for all categories in the population 
34 Cocozzelli (2009), p. 23.
35 UNMIK Regulation 2000/66 On benefi ts for war invalids of Kosovo and for the next of kin of those who died as a 
result of the armed confl ict in Kosovo, 21.12.2000; Administrative direction 2001/19 (28.11.2001).
36 Pensions ranged from 70 to 150DM a month. The earliest point in time to receive the benefi ts was from 
01.07.2001.
37 The disability levels had to be determined by a Central Medical Panel.
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that contributed to the war of the KLA.”38 Th is leads us to the question of how the KLA’s 
memory entrepreneurs conceptualise the hierarchy of victims and defi ne who ought to 
be entitled to receive war-related social welfare benefi ts. 
Th e assembly of Kosovo passed the law “On the Status and Rights of the Families of 
Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans and Members of the KLA”, on 23 February 2006, which had 
been processed since 2003 and to which the war associations had contributed signifi -
cantly in the drafting. Passing this law was declared a “moral obligation”, even though 
the law was envisaged not to be implemented before the year 2008 due to budgetary 
constraints.39 It specifi ed the following categories of benefi ciaries in order to diff erentiate 
entitlements: Families of Martyrs; War  Invalids and and the Families of Invalids after the 
Invalid’s Death; Veterans / Members of the KLA; War Hostages and Missing KLA-Sol-
diers; Civilian War Invalids; Civilian Victims of War; Civilian Hostages of War; Missing 
Civilian Persons. Not only did this law re-introduce a distinction between civilian and 
military victims (the military categories were rewarded with higher benefi ts and more 
generous provisions than the civilian ones), but it also introduced entitlements to pay-
ments from a disability level of 10% upwards for KLA invalids. For civilian invalids the 
eligibility barrier of 40% was maintained. For the families of martyrs and KLA invalids 
it foresaw a wide array of benefi ts, such as a legally protected special status, family pen-
sion, tax reductions, reduced electricity tariff s, free health care and physical rehabilitation 
measures, employment privileges and, for the family members of martyrs, preferential 
and free access to student dorms and free text books. 
In an attempt to defend the civic concept of social citizenship, the SRSGs Søren Jessen 
Petersen mandated several essential changes to terminology: ‘war’ was to be replaced by 
‘armed confl ict’; ‘martyr’ by ‘hero’; ‘national’ by ‘Kosovo’; ‘enemy’ by ‘adversary in the 
confl ict’; and phrases as ‘liberation war’, ‘war for freedom’ and ‘war against the occupa-
tion’ were to be deleted and replaced throughout the text.40 After these modifi cations 
were announced, the war associations proclaimed that they would not recognise the law 
with the new terminology and threatened mobilisation for the sake of “defending the 
values of the war of liberation”.41 Infl uential politicians with KLA background, such as 
Fatmir Limaj, former commander of Brigade 121, used their authority among the vet-
erans to assert their calming infl uence and to gain time in order to avoid the tensions to 
38 Available at: [http://www.ks-gov.net/mpms/Departamentet/Departamenti-i-Familjeve-Deshmoreve,-Invalide-
ve-te.aspx; accessed on 09.09.2010]
39 Ligji për vlerat e luftës miratohet, zbatimi pritet me 2008 [Law on the war values passed, implementation ex-
pected in 2008], Koha Ditore, 25.02.2006, p. 4.
40 Regulation Nr. 2006/29 on the Promulgation of the Law on the Status and the Rights of the Families of Martyrs, 
Invalids, Veterans, and Members of the KLA and of the Families of Civilian Victims of the Armed Confl ict in Koso-
vo adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo on 23.02.2006. 
41  Organizatat e dalura nga Lufta e UÇK-së kundërshtojnë ashpër ndryshimet në ligj [The war associations oppose 
the change of the law harshly], 06.05.2006; Organizatat në Komuna të gatshme për mbrojtjen e Vlerave të Luftës 
[The municipal war associations are ready to defend the war values], 15.06.2006, available at: http://www.vete-
rani.net/arkivi4.html [Accessed on: 11.01.2010]
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escalate further.42 Limaj claimed that the legal offi  ce of UNMIK accepted the need for 
revision and returned the law to the legal offi  ce of the UN in New York in May 2006. 
Since then, there has not been any indication of any further process.43 According to the 
head of the Offi  ce for Veterans’ Issues the law was annulled and, indeed, the hyperlink 
of the regulation, which promulgates the law, has never been activated. Th at is, the law 
is neither available on the website of the Kosovo Parliament nor has it been published in 
the Offi  cial Gazette.44 
In a newspaper interview, Limaj represented the memory entrepreneurs’ stance on the 
international administration’s interference in this law: 
We cannot accept that somebody should play with our past as it suits them and that some-
body should play with terminology based on how others interpret our war. Th is law has 
been made for the citizens of Kosovo and will be applied to its citizens. For the citizens of 
Kosovo there has been a war of liberation, for the citizens of Kosovo there were occupiers 
and enemies and for the citizens of Kosovo there have been and there will be, martyrs and 
heroes of the people. 
He continues: 
Th is is a historical law and we will not allow the administrators to write our national 
history […] In Kosovo, nobody of whatever leaning ever was able to change our history 
and even less so with administrative instructions.45 
In fact, despite its probable annulation, parts of the law eff ectively have been imple-
mented. Th e benefi ts foreseen in the new law for the war invalids and families of martyrs 
became available from January 2007, as the matter was seen better not to be left in the 
care of the international administration.46 In contrast, a subsequently issued administra-
tive direction declared UNMIK regulation 2000/66 to stay the legal basis for the fi nan-
cial support for the civilian war categories.47 Th e war invalids and families of martyrs 
enjoy preferential treatment over the veterans due to “their extraordinary sacrifi ce and 
their diffi  cult material and psychological (‘shpirtëror’) condition.”48 In January 2010 
the monthly payment for the war invalids increased considerably and a small but steady 
42 Limaj: T’i jepet kohë PSSP-së ta kthejë ‚konfl iktin e armatosur’ në ‚luftë’ [The SRSG should be granted time to 
return ‘armed confl ict’ into ‘war’], Koha Ditore, 17.05.2006, p.4
43 Ibid.
44 The editorial offi  ce of the Offi  cial Gazette confi rmed that a law, which does not appear in the offi  cial gazette, is 
not in force. Available at: [http://www.gazetazyrtare.com; accessed on: 11.01.2010] Jeta në Kosovë debaton për 
veteranët e luftës së UÇK-së [Life in Kosovo debates the KLA-war veterans], 04.03.2010, available at: [http://www.
jetanekosove.com/advCms/#id=1310,9925099].
45 Nuk lejojmë administratorët të na e shkruajnë historinë tonë, thotë Limaj [We don’t allow the administrators to 
write our history, says Limaj] Koha Ditore, 12.05.2006.
46 Interview in MPMS, DFDIL 20.04.2010.
47 Administrative Direction Nr. 02/2007 about the Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of the Law 02/ L-2 
(09/02/2007).
48 Ibid.
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growth in the number of recipients could be observed (see fi gures 1 and 2).49 A compari-
son of the benefi ts with other forms of social welfare, such as the social assistance scheme 
indicates the special status attributed to the ‘war categories’.50 For example, €75 was the 
highest rate of social assistance that a family could claim under certain conditions in 
2005, adjustable in lines with changes of the Consumer Price Index, whereas benefi ts 
for the ‘war categories’ were considerably higher (see fi gure 2 below). Furthermore, when 
taking the high unemployment (46%) and poverty rates into consideration (a third of 
the population suff ers from poverty while another 15% live in extreme poverty),51 the 
budget allocated to the “war categories” appears substantial.52 Yet the people of the war 
categories are among the poorest in society. Th erefore the war-related social assistance 
might have had a positive eff ect in terms of poverty reduction.
Figure 1: Development of no. of recipients of the war-related assistant schemes
War Invalids Families of Martyrs Families of civilian victims
Jan 2008 2,349 1,916 3,679
Aug 2008 2,519 2,038 4,749
Sept 2009 2,860 2,075 5,084
April 2010 2,952 2,066 5,095
Although the law introduced the category of war veterans, the applicable section was not 
included in the informal implementation. Neither has the provision that veterans are to 
receive free medical treatment ever translated into practice. As a consequence, a number 
of semi-formal and informal regulations and practices have emerged. For example, free 
medical treatment was realised by way of certain personalities “using their authority”; 
or specifi c municipalities with an affi  nity to the local branches of the war associations 
negotiating and assuring special rights of treatment in the communal health services for 
the ‘war categories’.53 
49 DFDIL: Llogaritja e Pensioneve në bazë të ligjit për Familjet e Dëshmorëve, Invalidëve të Luftës dhe Viktimave 
Civile me 100% të Pagesës [Calculation of the pensions based on the Law on Martyrs’ Families, War Invalids and 
Civilian Victims].
50 Cocozzelli (2009), p. 83.
51 The World Bank Kosovo Poverty Assessment, Vol. I: Accelerating Inclusive Growth to Reduce Widespread Pover-
ty, October 2007, p.8-9.
52 Attempting to calculate the amount spent on the diff erent categories, we are confronted with a statistical 
problem, since the expenses for particular categories are not specifi ed in the statistics. In 2008, €16,631,833 
out of €125,398,584 -- that is 13,6% of the MPMS’s budget -- were allocated for the pensions and benefi ts of all 
war categories including civilian victims of war. Out of this sum, about €301,850 can be directly identifi ed as 
special payments allocated to the war invalids and families of martyrs. Also, €96,000 were payed in subsidies for 
the war associations, which received an additional €374,000 for summer programmes, protheses and further 
unspecifi ed expenses. See: Working Report of the Government of Kosovo, Prishtina December 2008. Available 
at: [http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/RAPORTI_VJETOR_I_PUNES_SE_QEVERISE_2008.pdf ]. 
53 That is the case in the municipality of Suhareka: Interview with the head of the local branch of the veterans’ 
organisation in Suhareka on 15.09.2008. In the case of Klina municipality: Veteranët e UÇK-së kontrollojnë falas 
shëndetin e tyre. [Veterans check their health for free] Koha Ditore, 08.02.2008, S. 8.
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In his study of the general social assistance scheme, Cocozzelli demonstrates that, fur-
thermore, in some municipalities, such as Skenderaj, the veterans’ associations and par-
ties with a KLA-background co-opted the welfare system in favour of the ‘war catego-
ries’.54 Th is is characterised as a maldevelopment by my interviewees, as can be seen from 
the following statement: “Th ey treat us for free due to generosity, not because of any legal 
status. Since when do veterans have to rely on generosity?”55 Apart from their claim to 
welfare benefi ts and health services, in my interviewees’ eyes the refusal to institutionally 
“recognise” their sacrifi ces for an independent Kosovan state, in particular, is at odds 
with their self-perception. Th e Socialist Yugoslavian practice of decorating veterans with 
honours, according to their time of engagement in the partisan struggle is mirrored by 
the majority of my interviews. Th ose who served time as political prisoners, especially, 
and already from early on been actively involved in illegal movements or the clandestine 
organisation of the armed struggle, imply that they have contributed particularly much 
to the cause. A fi fty-fi ve year old veteran commented: 
54 Cocozzelli ( 2009), p. 119.
55 Group interview on 20.09.2008.
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I was arrested three times, served eight years in prison altogether, participated in the 
armed resistance, was eight years in the KPC. And now? Who am I now? Nothing. No-
body. I don’t even have a status.56 
My interviews suggest that the war of the KLA is understood as the founding war of a na-
tionally defi ned state. Moreover, the older interviewees use their participation in the war 
as symbolic capital (in the sense of Bourdieu) to back up political and socio-economic 
claims while negotiating social status in the process of restructuring post-war society. One 
of today’s social cleavages divides urban communities, which were well integrated in the 
Yugoslav state structures, from communities of experience that could less partake in the 
Yugoslav modernisation process and the social mobility which it instigated. Th e veterans 
from rural communities tend to explain their recurrent marginal position through a 
family history of armed resistance, drawing or constructing an historical continuity from 
their ancestors’ participation in armed groups already in the 1920s and at the end of the 
Second World War, which, they claim, stigmatised them in the eyes of the Yugoslav state, 
to their own participation in the KLA. Hence, claiming privileged access to social rights 
serves also to re-defi ne their own relationship with the state in its new form.
Th at the memory entrepreneurs aimed to create a sense of distance towards the previous 
Yugoslav state and to monopolise the war narrative is also mirrored in their attempt to 
marginalise the FARK troops, of which many members had pursued a career in the Yu-
goslav army and police. Th e process of demilitarisation was initiated by UNSCR 1244, 
which demanded that the “KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immedi-
ately all off ensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization.”57 Yet 
in the subsequent demilitarisation agreement, signed by the KLA chief Hashim Th açi 
and KFOR commander Lieutnant-General Mike Jackson on 20 June 1999, all Kosovo 
Albanian troops were subsumed under the KLA label.58 Also the subsequent IOM regis-
tration did not diff erentiate between KLA and FARK, but registered all Kosovo Albanian 
combatants as “KLA”.59 While it should be noted that KLA combatants, indeed, signifi -
cantly outnumbered those of FARK, the subsumation of FARK under the KLA label 
both supported and shaped the offi  cial defi nition of who led the Albanian resistance, 
who brought about liberation, and who should be recognised as such.
Taking into account the power struggles that had occurred, for instance in the Operative 
Zone of Dukagjin, FARK fi ghters occasionally found themselves excluded from com-
batant status after the war due to the rivalry between the two groups, if they had not 
subordinated themselves to the KLA command. One example of the rejection of the 
FARK-fi ghters’ contribution was the protest of the KLA veterans’ association against the 
decoration of Ahmet Krasniqi with the offi  cial title “Hero of Kosovo”. Krasniqi had been 
the former minister of defence of the Bukoshi government and commander of FARK 
56 Interview V.
57 UNSCR 1244, available at: [http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm].
58 “Undertaking of demilitarisation and transformation by the UCK”, see fn. 25.
59 Pozhidaev / Andzhelich (2005), p. 21.
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before he was murdered in Tirana in 1998. Th e Dukagjin branch of the KLA protested 
against this award and asked for a reversal of the decision, accusing Krasniqi of hostile 
agitation against the KLA and of attempting to corrupt individuals with the aim of 
weakening the KLA.60 Th e restriction of any military categories to members of the KLA 
only in all legal acts that are issued by the local institutions as well as the fact that access 
to benefi ts is conditioned on previous KLA membership, has paved the way for a social 
mechanism of exclusion. Occasionally this has had consequences for war invalids and 
families of fallen soldiers of the FARK-troops, both in terms of eligibility for social assist-
ance and of support from the veterans’ organisations. Th ese had become dependent on 
former KLA structures, when these had to confi rm the applicant having been a former 
fi ghter.61 To make matters worse, the OVL Statute provides even a vague formulation for 
withholding membership, which may be used to exclude FARK- members: „Somebody 
who has acted in contradiction to the principles and the ideal of the liberation war or 
who has collaborated in some way with the enemy, can in no one way be considered a 
member of the organisation”.62 Considering that the war associations play a signifi cant 
role as welfare provider and social security networks for the military ‘war categories’, 
namely “providing special welfare services aimed at family support” and channelling ad-
ditional project-bound assistance from the government and private donations, the exclu-
sion from membership can also imply a general exclusion from social support. 
Th e memory entrepreneurs of the KLA veterans’ circles were thus successful both in he-
gemonising the offi  cial narrative of the war and in translating their accounts of the war 
into access to war-related social assistance. A privileged access to social rights was only to 
be granted to those, who had fought ‘the real war of liberation’.
After the veterans had increasingly voiced their dissatisfaction with the institutional ne-
glect through protests and hunger strikes in the years 2008 and 2009, the government 
ventured to complete the legal architecture of welfare benefi ts for the ‘war categories’. At 
the time of writing, a law is expected to be passed by the parliament in autumn 2010. 
Th e Prime-Minister, himself a former KLA leader, announced that “the aim of this law 
is the determination of the status and the fi nancial support of the categories that have 
emerged from the war of the KLA through pensions and special benefi ts. Because with 
their sacrifi ce and contribution they were the decisive factor for the liberation and the 
60 Veteranët e Dukagjinit, kundër dekorimit të Ahmet Krasniqit [Veterans from Dukagjin against the decoration 
of A.K.], Koha Ditore, 16.10.2008. The same harsh reaction followed the decoration of FARK colonel Tahir Zemaj 
as “Hero of Kosovo” on 10.07.2010 in statements by the war associations from Dukagjin that were published 
online, calling him a traitor and anti-hero. ‘Sejdiu rehabiliton tradhëtinë dhe dezertorin e luftës së UÇK-së’ [Sejdiu 
rehabilitates the betrayal and the desertor of the war of the KLA], available at: [http://pashtriku.beepworld.de/
fi les/kosova_2010/korrik_2010/reagim_shvl_uck_sejdiu_shpall_herro_tradhtarin_zemaj_8.7.10.htm; accessed 
on 10.09.2010].
61 According to Administrative Direction Nr. 9/2006, Art. 6. a certifi cate had to be issued by the Kosovo Protection 
Corps Headquarters that the applicant has been a member of the KLA. In unclear cases, also the war associa-
tions might be asked for assistance. In an interview in the MPMS (Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare) it was 
confi rmed that there were cases which could not realise their rights on these grounds.
62 Paragraph 14, Statute of the OVL. Available at: [http://www.veterani.net/dokumente/statuti.pdf ].
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freedom of the country.”63 Of particular interest in this regard is the introduction of the 
category of national martyrs (‘dëshmorë të kombit’) in addition to that of KLA-martyrs. 
Th is applies to those who died in resistance to the Yugoslav state after 1945, thereby 
further stigmatising any active participation in the political system of the SFRY.64 In 
the case that the law will be passed and not vetoed by the ICR for contradicting the 
multi-ethnic state-ideology inscribed in the constitution, it will ultimately affi  rm both 
the new social hierarchy, as envisaged by the KLA’s memory entrepreneurs, and the war 
categories’ privileged access to social rights. If nothing else, the signifi cance given to this 
law is indicated by the high impact on the budget which it will have, with yearly costs 
estimated to range between € 30 and 50 million.65 
Conclusion
Th e issue of veterans’ politics and policies towards the KLA veterans has turned into an 
endurance test for the relationship between the local political actors in Kosovo and the 
international administration. On the one hand, the expectations of the veterans of the 
KLA and its successor organisations have been shaped by the historical experience of 
Socialist partisan veneration. On the other hand, the memory entrepreneurs’ insistence 
on gaining recognition for their war narrative was particularly conditioned by the local 
political power struggles waged through the “politics of war memory and commemora-
tion.” Th e veterans’ struggle for recognition in terms of celebrating the heroic nature of 
the KLA’s resistance and sacrifi ce as the foundation of the newly created Kosovan state 
can be related to their attempts of constructing a system of benefi ts and pensions that 
privileges them. Preferential social rights and access to social benefi ts was to be granted 
on the basis of a personal distance towards the formerly Yugoslav system, an early adher-
ence to the ideas of armed resistance and the military contribution to the liberation. In 
contrast, the FARK-forces were to be excluded from the offi  cial war narrative and, by 
extension, from war-related social benefi ts for the military categories as defi ned in new 
legislation. 
However, these demands to institutionally support war veterans of a nationalist libera-
tion army as voiced by local actors, led to irreconcilable contradictions within the multi-
ethnic political framework of an international peacekeeping mission, which attempted 
to promote a civic concept of social (and political) citizenship. In consequence of the 
international administration’s hesitance to approve the locally prepared new legislation of 
the war veterans’ status, local actors, including veteran circles and municipal structures, 
engaged in a number of informal and semi-offi  cial arrangements to meet the demands 
63 Sheti përkujdeset për kategoritë e dala nga lufta [The state provides fort the war categories]. Epoka e Re. 
03.08.2010.
64 This category will encompass an estimated 1,000 persons. Interview in MPMS 15.08.2010.
65 Ibid. 
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nevertheless, as they perceived these as legitimate. Yet, instead of weakening the veterans’ 
sense of themselves as a distinct group worth special considerations as intended, a general 
reliance on the war associations as an alternative social security network was furthered. 
Furthermore, a lack of legally enforced transparency and accountability regarding selec-
tion criteria as well as a lack of engagement with recent local histories cleared the way 
for internal social mechanisms of exclusion, and veterans continued to be receptive to 
the idea of political mobilisation. To conclude, UNMIK’s attempts at creating a civic 
citizenship regime in the fi eld of war victims’ benefi ts have eff ectively been subverted by 
the KLA’s memory entrepreneurs and made to serve their own agendas. My case study 
is thus an example of possible unintended consequences in post-war peace-building and 
demilitarisation programmes when local perspectives and agendas are not taken into 
account.
 
